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AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION.
By Walter F. Murphy,1 James E. Fleming,2 and William F.
Harris, 11.3 Mineola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press. 1986.
Pp. xxvi, 1262.

Fred L. Morrison4
Law is one of the major unifying themes of our contemporary
culture. A leading university which recently inventoried its "crossdisciplinary" courses discovered that the most frequent offerings
were in law. It was "business law" in the business school, "law and
medicine" in several divisions of the health sciences, "law for engineers" in the engineering school, etc.
One of the most venerable of these cross-disciplinary subjects is
constitutional law. There are really three distinct courses in most
universities which masquerade under that common name. In law
schools, Constitutional Law is designed to teach the mechanics of
the allocation and limitation of power (and of challenges to it), primarily to students who, as lawyers, will help to operate the system.
Even in law schools, the course may further the broad goals of a
liberal education; but it is also true that only in law schools do the
students focus on the technical details of pleading and practice. Accordingly, law teachers generally skip over historical topics, emphasizing the present and future tenses.
In history departments, study of the Constitution naturally has
a different purpose, emphasizing the past tense. The Constitution
makes superb history: perhaps nowhere else is there as continuous
and articulate a representation of the ideas and issues which have
driven our society, from nation-building in the early years, through
the dispute over slavery and states' rights in the nineteenth century,
the emergence of economic liberalism and commercial growth, the
acceptance of the government as a provider of social services, the
demand for (and definition of) equality, and the protection of the
poor and oppressed. The reports of the Court are of particular use
in this context because of the separate opinions, which frequently
join issue on the key philosophical questions of the day. (The absence of separate opinions may be even more revelatory of the intellectual climate.)
Political scientists have stood at the crossroads of the legal and
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historical traditions-and of others, such as sociology-and have
tried to make a niche for themselves in the study of the Constitution. Some have tried to tum the Constitutional Law course into a
haven for pre-law students, seeking to replicate the customs of legal
education, including both breadth of coverage (touching the entire
range of constitutional issues) and format of instruction (a Langdellian case-method). Others have tried to emulate the historical approach, chronicling the history of a particular era of the Court or
attempting a comprehensive analysis. Still others have sought refuge in the hard sciences of mathematics and statistics, using multiple regressions to obtain correlations which may or may not be
explicable to the average reader.
American Constitutional Interpretation exemplifies neither the
purely legal nor the purely historical approach. It is a text and case
book for undergraduate political science students which emphasizes
the role of the Supreme Court as an institution in the governmental
structure of the United States, especially through its authoritative
interpretation of the Constitution.
Although it contains cases, it is not a law text. It does not
purport to provide materials for a comprehensive course on Constitutional Law in the law school sense. It is also not a history text. It
does not provide a complete and chronological history of constitutional interpretation, but rather selects from basic historical periods
for its principal purpose, an examination of the role of constitutional interpretation in American government.
In addition to the usual selection of case materials, there is, for
each major section, an introductory essay by the authors, mentioning the salient questions, and a selection of articles by other authors,
presenting a balanced perspective on the issues. In the section on
Problems of Continuity and Change, for example, there are paired
pieces by Justice Rehnquist (as he then was) and Professor Dworkin. Other extra-judicial material, from the Federalist papers to
Presidential messages, adds to this useful mix.
Three basic issues emerge: What is the Constitution? Who
should interpret it? How should it be interpreted? The first explores
the questions of incorporation of the Bill of Rights, penumbras of
rights, and evolutionary vs. fixed interpretation. The second examines both separation of powers issues and federalism. The third,
and most extensive, deals with the interpretation of broad principles
in the Constitution, the protection of civil liberties (especially first
amendment issues) and equal protection. The book enables students to learn how the Supreme Court can evolve a complex and
detailed set of constitutional mandates from a few simple words,
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"Congress shall make no law ... "or "nor shall any state ... deny
to any person ... the equal protection of the laws." In focusing on
the question of interpretation, the authors emphasize the ability of
our constitutional system to deduce from broad general principles a
resolution of issues appropriate to the time and circumstances.
A final segment deals with constitutional law in times of military or foreign crisis, illustrating both the power and the limits of
constitutional interpretation. This section emphasizes the constitutional issues of the Civil War and of World War II. One might have
wished for a discussion of other, more contemporary crises, in
which constitutional interpretation helped to resolve serious political problems-for example, Watergate.
The Constitution will soon be guiding us into a third century of
national government. The method of interpretation which has ensured such durability, when constitutions around the world have
changed and changed again during that period, is certainly worthy
of study. This book centers on that process of interpretation, rather
than on particular interpretations present or past, and thus should
contribute measurably to the student's knowledge of our governmental system. It is neither a manual for lawyers nor a reference
work for historians, but rather an excellent text for students of the
art of government.
JUDICIAL CONFLICf AND CONSENSUS-BEHAVIORAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN APPELLATE
COURTS. Edited by Sheldon Goldmant and Charles M.
Lamb.2 Lexington, Ky.: The University Press of Kentucky.
1986. Pp. 294. $30.00.
Thomas P. Lewis 3

The political scientists who wrote the twelve essays in this
book are justifiably described in the overleaf as "major scholars of
judicial behavior." Their contributions, though published here for
the first time, do not form a tightly cohesive whole; the thread that
holds them together is their common focus on dissenting opinions
in cases decided at the appellate level of the federal and state court
systems. The editors explain that the book is aimed at a diverse
audience of students and scholars in political science, social psyI.
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